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Abstrat
AgriPoliS is a multi-agent mixed integer linear programming (MIP) model,
spatially expliit, developed in C++ language and suitable for long-term
simulations of agriultural poliies. One extended to deal with typial har-
aters of the Mediterranean agriulture, AgriPoliS is used in this paper to
desribe the implementation of alternative poliy senarios and to apply them
to two regions loated in Central and South Italy. Results suggest that the ef-
fets of deoupling poliies in the Mediterranean agriulture, as implemented
in the 2003 reform, are often dominated by eets of strutural trends and
only a bond sheme would substantially hange the regional farm stru-
tures. In no senario we observe remarkable agriultural land abandonment.
Keywords: Mediterranean Agriulture, Common Agriultural Poliy,
Multi-Agent Model
EonLit Classiation: Q120, Q180, C610
1 Introdution
This paper is a result of Workpakage 7 (Modelling Mediterranean agriul-
ture) of the IDEMA researh projet and follows the paper already present-
ing AgriPoliSMed, the extension of the AgriPoliS model suited to study the
Mediterranean agriulture. Our aim was to ondue regional-level analisis of
the impat of deoupling poliies on the Mediterranean agriulture [4℄. The
aim of the present paper is to ondue regional regional-level analysis of the
impat of deoupling on the Mediterranean agriulture. To ahieve this, we
apply the model and generate simulations on two reigons with a dierent
degree of Mediterranean haraters.
Setion 2 shortly introdues the model used to generate simulations. Se-
tion 3 is divided in three parts: subsetion 3.1 desribes the fators we took
into onsideration to hoose the ase-study regions; subsetion 3.2 desribes
soures for model data and subsetion 3.3 presents a omparison between the
two real regions and the orresponding virtual regions we modelled. Setion
4 desribes the three poliy senarios for whih simulations are arried. Sim-
ulation results are then prsented and ommented in setion 5, to ompare
the eets of deoupling on the two regions. Setion 6 onludes.
2 The AgriPoliSMed regional multi-agent model
Our simulations are generated using AgriPoliSMed whih is an improvement
of AgriPoliS, a multi-agent, spatially expliit simulation framework.
2
AgriPo-
liS allows to model heterogeneous farms behaviours under various external
situations (typially, under dierent poliy senarios) and observe regional
results by aggregating these miro-level behaviours.
AgriPoliS uses a mixed integer linear programming approah to simulate
eah agent behaviour. On the one hand, this approah is very exible, as it
an over the whole range of farm ativities, from growing spei rops to
2
Detailed information on AgriPoliS an be found on [2℄, [3℄ or [6℄, while [4℄ desribes
AgriPoliSMed, that is the adaptation of AgriPoliS to Mediterranean regions.
1
Figure 1: Example of an AgriPoliS Sreenshot
investing in new mahinery or hiring new labour units. Furthermore, it is
simple to add new regional-spei ativities. On the other hand, however,
linear programming tehniques require a long alibration phase to assure a
balaned hoie of farm ativities, avoiding unrealisti outomes.
Any farmer in the model is a real farmer whose data are taken from
the FADN dataset and expliitly assoiated to a spatial loation. Due to
privay-protetion regulations, however, we don't have aess to the real
farm loalisation. Therefore, we have to distribute farms randomly in the
virtual region. Spae (i.e. loation) is important in the model beause it
inuenes transport osts and indiretly makes the farmers interat eah
other, e.g. by ompeting for the same land plots. Figure 1 is a sreenshot of
a simulation arried out Marhe region data where eah pixel is a plot of the
virtual region and eah olour identies a distint farm, blak being not
agriultural area.
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3 The regional adaptation
3.1 Region seletion
As the main goal AgriPoliSMed is to adapt AgriPoliS to the Mediterranean
agriulture to apture the eets of deoupling poliies on that spei on-
text, we rst need to investigate the relevant harateristis ofMediterranean
agriulture. [4℄ provides detailed statistial evidene about ountries border-
ing the Mediterranean sea, both in terms of stritly agriultural prodution
that in terms of the overall soio-eonomial situation. We an here report
the main harateristis emerging from that analysis:
• highly heterogeneous natural onditions that lead to heterogeneous set
of produts and quality dierentiations
• vegetable-oriented agriultural prodution: (-) livestok, dairy and e-
reals, (+) vegetable, hortiulture, olives and grapes
• labour intensive produtions
• very high land fragmentation, leading to many small, part-time man-
aged farms
• elderly farmers, on average
To better represent the dierentiated eets of deoupling, we work in parallel
on two regions, to apture a gradient of these harateristis. One region
should have just partial Mediterranean haraters, whereas the seond one
presents these harateristis more extremely.
After having investigated agriultural produtions, farm struture and
FADN data availability of various Italian regions, we seleted the Colli Esini
area, a portion of Marhe region, as the intermediate Mediterranean ase,
and Piana di Sibari, a portion of Calabria region, as the extreme Mediter-
ranean one. The geographial loation of the two regions is reported in Figure
2.
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Figure 2: Geographial loation of Colli Esini and Piana di Sibari regions
Several gures learly show this gradient of Mediterranean harateristis
between Marhe and Calabria: the share of agriultural GDP of Mediter-
ranean rops is around 40% on Marhe and reah 65% for Calabria
3
. At the
same time the average farm size (UAA) is 8.4 ha for Marhe and just 3.7 ha
for Calabria. Finally, land rent prie is not very muh dierent in the two
regions; however, the rented land share is more than double in Marhe (26%
and 11%, respetively).
Within Marhe region, the Colli Esini area was hosen for being a quite
homogeneous area with enough FADN farms (159, aording to 2001 dataset).
It is made by 24 muniipalities (LAU2
4
) for a total of around 50,0000 UAA
hetares. These muniipalities belong to the same labour-distrit, following
ISTAT lassiation, though this is not identied by an oial administrative
border.
3
By Mediterranean rops we mean wine, olive oil, durum wheat, itrus fruits, vegeta-
bles. Data elaborated from Eurostat
4
LAU stand for Loal Administrative Units. LAU1 were formally know as NUTS4 and
LAU2 as NUTS5
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Colli Esini is a hilly area loated between the oast and the inner moun-
tainous part of the region. It ontains about 6000 farms, with an average size
omparable with the whole Marhe region. The high majority (89%) of these
farms are exlusively based on family labour. Area is mostly ultivated with
arable rops (87%), with a signiant permanent rops' area (9%, mainly
vineyards) and a very limited grassland area (2%). Finally, animal produ-
tions are oasional with the only signiant prodution being pig meat (7900
pigs over 50 kg).
Piana di Sibari is a geographially well delimited at area (the word
piana in Italian means at) that overlooks the Ionian sea on east and is
surrounded by mountains in all other diretions, proteting it from strong
winds and leading to a dry limate (it rains less than 600mm/year, mainly
in winter). The region is atually smaller than Colli Esini (29,000 UAA ha)
and it onsist of only 7 large muniipalities LAU2; FADN reords are only
134 (in 2001 dataset).
Considering ensus data, thus inluding all farms, Piana di Sibari presents
a surprisingly high number of farms (10626), leading to an average size of
only 2.75 UAA ha/farm. Most of these farms, however, does not arry out
any real ommerial ativity. In modelling the virtual region, we dropped a
large portion of these very small farms also onsidering that, omprehensibly,
no FADN data were available for them. Thus, we limited the attention to the
remaining 4631 farms, the majority of whih still does not use extra-family
labour (76%). Atually, we ould expet even higher share of family labour,
but most farm ativities in this area are highly labour intensive: in the region
we have only 30% of arable land, while the rest is devoted to labour intensive
permanent rops (65%, mainly itrus rops and olive trees), with a residual
share of grassland (5%). Animal produtions are sare, with just around
2000 dairy ows and 1350 pigs in the whole area.
More details about the modelled regions are reported in the Appendix, as
well as in [1℄ espeially with respet to landsape and environmental aspets.
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3.2 Data soures
3.2.1 Regional level
We used real regional data to dene our virtual regions. The primary soure
for data at the regional level is the ISTAT 2000 agriultural Census reporting
the following variables:
• Farm dimension: total farms, average area and farm distribution on
several size lasses;
• Labour: total farm and family labour and farm distribution by share
of family labour;
• Agriultural land use: land usage by eah rop (then aggregated by
land type);
• Animals: distribution of animals by type, age and size.
However, in Census all eonomi information about the farms are missing.
Furthermore, as we do not have aess to single-farm data on the Census
dataset, we are also unable to assign eah farm to a typology. Therefore, we
use the FADN farm-type distribution as a proxy for the real regional farm
distribution by typology.
3.2.2 Farm level
All our farm-level data ome from the FADN 2001 dataset. In priniple,
the FADN sample should inlude only ative farms, that is with ommerial
ativity. However the minimum eonomi size admitted in the dataset in
2001 is just 2 ESU, that is 2,400 euros
5
. As omparison, the minimum size
for Frane and Germany in 2001 is 8 ESU, and for United Kingdom and
Netherlands is 16 ESU. The presene of very small farms in our dataset
5
Starting from 2002 the minimum eonomi size was inreased to 4 ESU, still relatively
small.
6
strongly inuenes our results as on these farms strutural time trends seems
to overome the impat of any implemented poliy.
In addition, we have aess to a limited sub-set of single-farm FADN
dataset. In partiular, we miss the exat indiation of animals owned by
farmers, available information only onerning the Livestok Units owned by
eah farm for that spei type (e.g. beef attle, dairy...). Thus, we apply
the animal distribution by age lass obtained from the Census data to derive
the number of animals from the Livestok Units .
3.2.3 Tehnial and eonomi oeients
The third set of information still missing in our datasets are the tehnologial
and eonomial parameters that frame the spae where farmers' deisions are
modelled. We olleted these parameters mainly from [5℄ and, for region-
spei parameters (e.g. yield), we alulated them diretly from the FADN
dataset. Setions 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 of [4℄ desribe in details the methodology
we used
6
.
3.3 The resulting "virtual" region
With the regional-level data and the single-farm data from the FADN dataset,
we an perform the upsaling step. Using optimisation tehniques, we ap-
ply to eah farm of the FADN dataset a saling oeient with the objetive
to obtain a virtual region, only ontaining heterogeneous FADN farms, with
aggregated values lose to the gures of the real region we are investigating.
Examples of parameters onsidered in this upsaling stage are the distribu-
tion of farms by size lasses, land use and total animals.
Figures 3 and 4 ompare the farm size distribution and on the land use
in the real and virtual regions, and in the FADN dataset. We an appreiate
that in both ases (Marhe and Calabria), even if the lower limit of the
FADN dataset is largely below the EU standards, the FADN farms are still
6
The matrix ontaining the initial gross margins and the resoure requirements for eah
ativity is available under request by the autors.
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Figure 3: Farm dimension
Soures: our alulations on ISTAT Census 2000 and FADN 2001 datasets.
Figure 4: Land Use
Soures: our alulations on ISTAT Census 2000 and FADN 2001 datasets.
onsiderable bigger than the whole regional sample. In the Piana di Sibari
we have the spei problem that we do not have any farm smaller than one
hetare in the FADN sample, even if in the real region this size lass shows
the highest numerousness. Despite this, we are able to selet our FADN
farms in suh a way that the size distribution in our virtual region is quite
similar to the real region. In partiular, referring to the land use, we an
notie that the upsaling proess was able to give us a virtual region muh
more similar to the real one than the unadjusted FADN dataset.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of the upsaling oeients applied to
any FADN farm to generate the virtual region; for example, a oeient of
150 applied to a spei FADN farm means that this farm will enter our
virtual region 150 times. Although, these 150 farms ome from the same
FADN reord, eah one is dierent, as the model assignes it a random spatial
8
Figure 5: Upsaling oeient distribution
Soures: our alulations
loation in the virtual region and a random age to its endowments. [4℄
disusses in detail how modelled farms dier from eah other. A detailed
quantitative omparison among the real region, the virtual region and the
FADN dataset is reported in Table 3.
4 Poliy senarios
AgriPoliS is able to generate projetions under dierent poliy senarios.
7
In the initial period the model ollets the subsides reeived by eah farm,
then automatially alulates the single-farm payment (SFP) due to any dif-
ferent farmer and nally assigns the SFP to farmers. This allows exible
implemention of the various poliy senarios. We an desribe them aord-
ing to several type of parameters and how these vary aross the three poliy
senarios.
Fixed parameters. These parameters usually do not vary aross senar-
ios. They refer to basi oeients (e.g. milk per ow or labour hours for
7
Several other modelling approahes an be followed to analyse the impat of poliy
reform and, in partiular, of deoupling on farm struture and prodution, as well on
markets. In this respet, see papers presented at the 93rd EAAE Seminar, held in Prague
on September 22nd and 23rd 2006.
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standard annual work unit), to quotas (e.g. milk quota) and to modulation
thresholds.
Produt spei parameters. For eah ommodity, we speify if a
payment sheme is ative, whih kind of payment will be onverted into the
SFP alulations (eg. euros/ha, euros/ow..) and, nally, for how many years
AgriPoliS has to ollet these data to alulate the SFP; for most produt it
is a three years period, but in ase of olive oil it is a 4 years period.
Time spei parameters. Here we inlude some options, for instane
the ativation of the regional implementation (i.e., the SFP has the same
value per hetare for all farmers in the region) or of the farm-spei im-
plementation (eah farm reeive a SFP depending on the payments got dur-
ing the referene period), or the full-deoupling option that dier from the
farm-spei payment as it doesn't require the statutory management re-
quirements and it is payable also in ase of abandonment (bond sheme).
We an also hoose year-by-year the appliation of the degree of modulation
for the various payments.
Time and produt spei parameters. These parameters allow us to
selet, for any produt and year, how muh payment is still oupled and how
muh deoupled payment, alulated in the referene period, should be on-
sidered. Using these two parameters we an set partially deoupled payments
(this mixed sheme urrently applies, for instane, to durum wheat).
4.1 Senario 1: Agenda 2000
This is the baseline senario. It simply is the ontinuation of the oupled pay-
ment sheme under the Agenda 2000 regime, thus without SFP, modulation
and ross-ompliane. However, in this senario we don't inlude the dairy
oupled payment beause our prie data refer to 2001, when high milk prie
support was still in ation. In the following years, the prie support delined
10
and was replaed by the ompensation sheme introdued by Agenda 2000.
Nonetheless, as in AgriPoliS pries are xed and it is not possible to model
their redution starting from the initial spei year, we do not introdue
the diret payment to avoid a misleading double support.
4.2 Senario 2: Atual implementation
This senario is the losest to the real implementation of the 2003 reform in
Italy. In table 1 we summarize suh implementation. As our model starts
generating projetions from 2001 and being based it is based on 2001 FADN
data, we miss the 2000 referene year and, to mantain the three years refer-
ene period, we shift it one year onward, that is to 2001-2003 (2001-2004 for
olive oil). In addition, as mentioned, we an not properly model dairy deou-
pling. As the ativation of the deoupling sheme is not a produt-spei
option in AgriPoliS, we are fored to start the deoupling period in the same
year for all produt (i.e. 2005).
Besides these simplyng assumptions, this implementation still maintain
most harateristis of the real deoupling sheme adopted in Italy (e.g, the
appliation of art. 69): payments maintain a 7% oupled support, livestok
setor 8%, sheep and goat and olive oil 5%. These payments do not enter the
SFP but are payed bak to farmers in terms of oupled support (for example,
88 euros/ha for durum wheat). Finally, this senario implements modulation
with a 3% retention in 2005, 4% in 2006 and 5% onward, for SFPs higher
than 5000 euros.
4.3 Senario 3: Bond sheme
The bond sheme senario is extremely simple as it mainly diers from
the atual implementation for the fat that it doesn't imply any statutory
management and maintenane requirements in order to preserve the SFP
rights. Consequently, farmers an abandon the agriultural setor and still
reeive the payment. A further dierene is that all premiums are fully
11
Table 1: Italian agriultural poliy implementation
Atual implementation
ereals livestok dairy payments olive oil tobao
2000 REF COUP REF COUP REF PR. SUP REF COUP REF COUP
2001 REF COUP REF COUP REF PR. SUP REF COUP REF COUP
2002 REF COUP REF COUP REF COUP REF COUP REF COUP
2003 COUP COUP COUP REF COUP COUP
2004 COUP COUP COUP COUP COUP
2005 DEC DEC COUP COUP COUP
2006 DEC DEC DEC DEC DEC
2007 DEC DEC DEC DEC DEC
2008 DEC DEC DEC DEC DEC
AgriPoliS implementation
ereals livestok dairy payments olive oil tobao
2001 REF COUP REF COUP PR. SUP REF COUP REF COUP
2002 REF COUP REF COUP PR. SUP REF COUP REF COUP
2003 REF COUP REF COUP PR. SUP REF COUP REF COUP
2004 COUP COUP PR. SUP REF COUP COUP
2005 DEC DEC PR. SUP DEC DEC
2006 DEC DEC PR. SUP DEC DEC
2007 DEC DEC PR. SUP DEC DEC
2008 DEC DEC PR. SUP DEC DEC
REF->referene period (payments are alulated for the SFP)
COUP->oupled payments
PR. SUP -> prie support
DEC->SFP
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deoupled, but this is a minor dierene in ase of Italy where most payments
are already fully deoupled in the atual implementation.
5 Model results
In this setion we present the results of model simulations under alternative
poliy senarios, partiularly pointing out the dierenes emerging between
the two regions under study.
Farm numerousness and size In both regions simulations start with
a very high number of farms. AgriPoliS only models farm behaviour in
eonomi terms, though. Many farms are atually very small and the reasons
why they are still ative farms often have to be found in soial and even
ultural fators, rather than in lassial eonomi motivations.
Thus, quite surprisingly, Figure 6 shows that abandonment is higher in
Colli Esini region, where farm average size is relatively larger, ompared to
Piana di Sibari. This may be explained by the fat that in Colli Esini, with
the exeption of farms produing quality wine, most farms an grow only
low-inome ereals, so their small size onstraint has a muh more binding
eet on their protability. On the ontrary, most Piana di Sibari farms an
rely on intensive produtions that an support a protable farm ativity even
in small farm sizes.
Looking at gures 6 and 7, the deision to abandon the farm ativity
atually seems more related to a pre-existing strutural trend than being in-
uened by the CAP reform. During period 1990-2003 in Italy we observed
an average 2.32% abandonment rate (Figure 7). Our senarios (with the ex-
lusion of the bond sheme) show a omparable abandonment rate, ranging
between 3.19% and 3.32% for Colli Esini and 1.78% and 1.96% for Piana di
Sibari (see Table 2). The omplete deoupling senario (bond sheme) has
a larger impat in this respet partiularly in Colli Esini.We an explain this
latter aspet again with the dierent produtions in the two areas: as de-
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Figure 6: Total number of farms
Soure: model results
Figure 7: Long-time trends in Italian Agriulture
Soure: Eurostat; FAOSTAT
oupling mainly aets ereals and livestok produtions, Colli Esini is muh
more sensible to CAP regime hange than Piana Di Sibari.
To better understand the strutural impat of poliy senarios we divide
our farms in ve size lasses
8
and we observe their evolution during the sim-
ulations (gures 8 and 9). Even in this ase quite surprisingly, our results
show that not the smallest farms quit the ativity. This is one typial demon-
8
We apply the following lassiation based on UAA and on the Italian small-size
standards:
0 (miro-farms) : <2ha;
1 (small) : <6ha;
2 (middle) :<15ha;
3 (large) : <50ha;
4 (extra-large) : >=50ha.
14
stration of how heterogeneity is relevant in the model. In fat, in Colli Esini
all farms of lass 0 ultivate perennial rops (mainly wine prodution), while
lass 1 farms mostly present arable rops. Therefore, while under the on-
tinuation of Agenda2000 or the atual CAP reform implementation, these
small arable rop farms still survive, in the bond sheme senario they
mostly abandon while their land is taken over by either bigger farms or, in
some ases, smaller but still ompetitive wine produers.
In Piana di Sibari, however, we have not this partiular situation and
farm quitting is muh more homogeneous aross size lasses, with an higher
abandonment rate in the two smallest lasses, as expeted. Even in this
region, the bond sheme senario has a stronger impat on arable rop
farms, that mainly belong to the seond size lass.
Figure 10 reports the two regions at the beginning and at the end of the
simulation runs (where eah olour rappresent a dierent farm), for the atual
implementation senario and the bond sheme. Both senarios, partiularly
the latter, show a simpliation of the farm struture where the remaining
farms grow using the land made available by the quitting farms.
Land rental pries In our model, rental ontrats endogenously arise from
agent's iterations; onsequently, we an observe eets of dierent poliies on
rental pries (gures 11 to 14). As expeted, we have a deline of arable land
rental prie in the bond sheme senario, aused by a remarkable drop of
land demand. On the ontrary, under the atual implementation senario,
the rental prie seems to inrease, espeially for irrigable land and allowing
produtions of more protable rops like vegetables, while grassland rental
prie shows a similar deline (more details on these results an be found in
the Appendix).
At the opposite, rental pries of land produing ommodities not involved
by the CAP reform (e.g. grapes, fruit) shows no deline, also with a small
inrease in the atual implementation ase. It must be reminded, however,
that these result ould over-estimate deoupling eets on perennial rop
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Figure 8: Farms distribution by initial size lasses
Colli Esini
Piana Di Sibari
Soure: model results
Note: lasses are thoose of note 8, smallest being on bottom
Figure 9: Land distribution by initial size lasses
Colli Esini
Piana Di Sibari
Soure: model results
Note: lasses are thoose of note 8, smallest being on bottom
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Figure 10: Spaial farm alloation on Colli Esini (left) and Piana di Sibari
(right)
2001 - Starting simulation
2015 - Atual Implementation
2015 - Bond sheme
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Figure 11: Arable land rental pries
Arable dry land
Irrigable dry land
Soure: model results
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Figure 12: Rental prie of table wine area*
Soure: model results
* We report a 0 value for Piana di Sibari on year 2001 beause there is no available wine area to be rented
on that year.
Figure 13: Rental prie of itrus fruit land
Soure: model results
land rental prie, as land renting is atually very unommon for perennial
rops. Analogously, itrus fruit land shows a growing nominal rental prie
under partial deoupling, but it remains onstant under full deoupling. Fi-
nally, rental prie of olive oil dry area is strongly inuened by the eets of
deoupling on this prodution. The bond sheme senario seems to have
a stronger eet in Piana di Sibari, as olive oil prodution is muh more
ommon in this region and many farms are speialized in this rop. On the
ontrary, in Colli Esini olive oil prodution is often just a marginal ativity
for farms where the main produt is something else, often wine grapes; thus,
we don't observe a major impat on in its land rental prie.
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Figure 14: Rental prie of dry olive oil area
Soure: model results
Land use Despite other strong eets of deoupling on farms, the impat
on land use even in the bond sheme senario is very limited. We an
explain this results with the high fragmentation of Italian agriulture in many
small farms; thus, land demand is always high (for this reason land pries
are higher than most other EU ountries). As AgriPoliS is able to model
the impat on farm size (through the availability of many investments in
dierent size options), it an well represent ath the attempts of farms to
inrease their size in order to produe more eiently. As rental ontrats
are assigned through an aution without minimal level onstraints, if land
supply inreases and, at the same time, demand delines as result of farm
quitting, the rental prie may deline until it beomes protable for farmers
to rent it. So, due to rental prie hanges, we observe a very small land
abandonment and we don't register unused land even in full deoupling ase,
i.e under the bond sheme senario (Figure 16). Figure 15 shows the only
ase where our model generates an amount of land used for management
obligations only (as required by ross-ompliane and statutory management
requirements).
Farm diversiation We are also interested to assess if, in our model,
farms tend to speialize on some setors or, on the ontrary, to diversify
prodution. Then, we alulate the average number of produts obtained
by farms. From model results (gure 17), we observe a general tendeny to
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Figure 15: Idle grassland [%℄
Soure: model results
Figure 16: Land abandonment [%℄
Soure: model results
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Figure 17: Average produts by farm
Soure: model results
Figure 18: Average produts by farm - adjusted
Soure: model results
diversiation, sine farms produe a higher number of produts over years.
This is mostly explained by the inrease in the average size. In fat, one we
adjust our oeient by the farm size (gure 18), we notie that, on average,
farms atually tend to produe a smaller number of produts, that is, to
speialize.
We an also observe that, again, the atual implementation senario
has a very small impat on this speialization-diversiation proess. We an
explain the larger impat of the bond sheme senario on Piana di Sibari
by the fat that here the land dropped by small farms is used by bigger farms
with the same kind of speialization and looking for sale eets, whereas in
Colli Esini this available land is used also by small perennial rops' farms
taking advantage of the deline of arable and grass land rental prie.
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Figure 19: Total agriultural labour [AWU/100ha℄
Soure: model results
Labour Labour gures learly show a strutural delining trend in both
regions (Figure 19). In the model, this labour saving pattern is implemented
trough new investments having smaller labour requirements than the older
ones they replae (due to tehnologial progress) and, above all, through
size eets, that is bigger size investments requiring less per unit labour
than smaller ones. Figure 19 also indiates a strong eet of the bond
sheme senario on labour redution and a smaller eet of the atual
implementation senario. While the former ase is evidently a result of
abandonment of the smallest and ineient arable rop farms, the eets of
the latter are of more diult interpretation. It seems that the redution
of agriultural labour fore in Colli Esini (-14.3% under the agenda 2000
senario) ould be explained by the deline of beef prodution, while in Piana
di Sibari (-5.6%) by the deline of olive oil prodution.
Figure 20 reports the o-farm share of farm family labour. In Colli Esini
the bond sheme senario reets abandonment of farms that previously
were already more o-farm oriented; on the ontrary, the atual implemen-
tation senario keeps suh farms ative but more oriented toward labour-
saving produtions. Piana di Sibari results show a more omplex path. We
notie an initial drop of o-farm labour that is probably aused by a poor
alibration of the model on this aspet; then we observe an inrease of o-
farm labour in two senarios and a deline in the bond sheme ase, as in
the other region. In both regions, however, atual implementation seems
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Figure 20: O-farm labour [%℄
Soure: model results
to inrease the share of o-farm labour. This is a lear diret eet of the
senario onstrution (but also of poliy design) that fores farms to remain
in the setor to mantain the right to the SFP.
Farm protability Figure 21 shows the average per ha net prot of the
farm. We dene farm net prot as the sum of the revenues oming by prod-
uts, diret premiums and deoupled premiums (SFP) less all expliit osts
(inluding apital depreiation). Therefore, we do not inlude opportunity
osts of own fators (labour, land and apital). Per ha prot shows a slight
but onstant deline over time; however, the bond sheme senario shows
the strongest drop. This deline is also due to the fat that the gure only
reports only the prots of the still-ative farms. Under the bond sheme,
even farmers who quitted prodution still reeive the SFP, but this is not
omputed in this gure. The atual implementation senario seems to have
a small impat on per ha prot ompared to Agenda 2000.
When looking at real degree of deoupling (i.e., the real deoupling rate)
in the two regions (Figure 22), we notie that it reets their dierent prod-
ut omposition. In Colli Esini the share of rops supported by the CAP
is higher and even in the atual implementation we observe a onsiderable
level of oupled support (18.3%), mainly due to durum wheat and qual-
ity payments
9
. In Piana di Sibari, even in the atual implementation, we
9
Reg EU 1782/2003, art. 69 and art. 72
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Figure 21: Farm net prot per ha [euro/ha℄
Soure: model results
Figure 22: Real deoupling rate - [%℄
Soure: model results
ahieve an almost full deoupling rate (the oupled support is just 6.7%)
Spei rops and livestok produtions Though AgriPoliS is more
suited to the analysis of the impats on farm struture rather than on spei
ommodity produtions (for instane, pries are xed and exogenous), we an
still look at the impat of the three poliy senarios on major Mediterranean
rops.
With regard to durum wheat, simulations reveals a signiantly heteroge-
neous situation between the two regions, with Colli Esini showing almost no
hange and Piana di Sibari, at the opposite, a quite negative impat. As the
gross margin of this rop is higher in Calabria (860 euro/ha ompared to 502
euro/ha in Colli Esini), the reason of this sharp deline relies on the omplex
25
Figure 23: Durum Wheat area
Soure: model results
Figure 24: Vegetables area
Soure: model results
mix of alternative options deoupling gives to farmers. In partiular, it seems
that in Colli Esini there are no viable alternatives to durum wheat, while in
Piana di Sibari it is possible to re-alloate labour, land and other resoures
to other more protable farm produtions.
Being vegetables labour-intensive and highly protable rops, model re-
sults indiate that they benet from deoupling due to more available labour
and land dropped by previously supported ommodities. In this respet, it
must be reminded that our deoupling senarios, even atual implementa-
tion, admit that all land dropped by previously supported rops an then
be used for vegetable rops, though this is not entirely allowed in the the
urrent regulation
10
.
10
Reg. EU 1782/2003 n. 1782, art. 51
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Figure 25: Olives area
Soure: model results
In some perennial rops (both grapes and fruit prodution) we don't ob-
serve a signiant response to CAP hange. On the ontrary, the impat
seems quite large on olives prodution, even with signiant regional dier-
enes. While in Colli Esini we don't have impat on the indeed marginal
olive oil prodution, we atually observe a sharp deline in Piana di Sibari.
As already mentioned, the reason is that olive growers in Colli Esini are not
speialized in this prodution, being mostly wine produers. In Piana di
Sibari, speialized olive growers are muh more aeted by the deoupling.
A nal remark on the livestok setor. In both regions livestok is almost
negligible, with Colli Esini reahing a maximum of 0.06 LU/ha in 2014 under
the agenda 2000 senario and Piana di Sibari a maximum of 0.16 LU/ha
in 2014 under the bond sheme senario. Again, the impat seems to de-
pend more on farms struture than on diret eets of CAP reform on these
ativities.
6 Conlusions
In this paper, we use samples of heterogeneous farms to build a model suitable
to simulate the eets of dierent agriultural poliies on these heterogenous
farm strutures and ouput omposition. Farm samples are olleted from
two Italian regions diering in terms of typial Mediterranean agriultural
harateristis. These samples are then resaled to build two virtual regions
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showing, on aggregate gures, similar haraters with respet to the real
regions.
Results emphasize the omplex interation among heterogeneous farms
and ross eets are well aptured by the model. Dierenes in farm stru-
ture are often the key explanation of dierent responses to CAP hange in
the two regions. Furthermore, the long-run strutural trends often overlap
and even hide the eets arising form dierent poliy implementations. This
is the ase of the sharp deline in number of farms and in agriultural labour.
Nonetheless, even in the bond sheme senario we don't observe a substan-
tial land abandonment. Eventually, within the model, it is the deline of land
rental prie to allow land to be realloated to other agriultural ativities.
However, in our model we neither onsider marginal areas nor land demand
from other setors (e.g. urban uses).
We also investigate whih farmers an get the best opportunities in the
new CAP senarios, that is under deoupling. Our simulations show that
size by itself is not neessarily a key fator, as arable rop farms need a muh
larger size to ahieve sale eonomies and be ompetitive ompared with
permanent rop farms that may remain protable also with a very small
land size. At the end, we expet that the deoupling sheme, as introdued
in Italy after the 2003 CAP reform, auses quite limted hanges on land use
and on farm struture. On the ontrary, a more radial reform, like the bond
sheme senario, would allow farms to leave the setor, still reeiving the
SFP, and this would remarkably hange the farm regional struture. How-
ever, even in this ase, we don't observe radial hanges on several aggregated
agriultural gures, e.g. produtions and land use.
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A Appendix
Table 1: Region delimitation
Dediated to Virginia Alltoft Wikramatillake
Table 2: Farms average yearly abandonment rate (%)
Soure: Eurostat, model results
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Table 3: Comparison between the real and virtual regions and the FADN
dataset
Soure: Census 2000, FADN 2001, upsaling results
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Table 4: FADN farms' upsaling weight distribution
Soure: upsaling results
Table 5: Farm distribution by 2001 farm size
Soure: model results
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Table 6: Land distribution by 2001 farm size
Soure: model results
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20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
Total number of farms - [farms]
 - agenda 2000 5,490 5,040 5,040 4,980 4,920 4,830 4,770 4,650 4,500 4,350 4,140 4,020 3,900 3,540
 - actual implementation 5,490 5,040 5,040 4,980 4,920 4,860 4,800 4,680 4,500 4,260 4,080 4,050 3,930 3,600
 - bond scheme 5,490 5,040 5,040 4,980 2,820 2,670 2,610 2,370 2,280 2,220 2,100 2,070 2,010 1,890
Profit - [€/ha]
 - agenda 2000 1,116 1,079 1,075 1,074 1,047 1,043 1,044 1,033 1,040 1,038 1,028 1,011 1,012 991
 - actual implementation 1,116 1,079 1,075 1,074 1,079 1,072 1,069 1,054 1,040 1,020 988 987 967 934
 - bond scheme 1,116 1,079 1,075 1,074 916 900 907 892 890 870 866 861 858 837
Average farm size - [ha]
 - agenda 2000 9.25 10.07 10.07 10.19 10.32 10.51 10.64 10.92 11.28 11.67 12.26 12.63 13.02 14.34
 - actual implementation 9.25 10.07 10.07 10.19 10.32 10.44 10.58 10.85 11.28 11.92 12.44 12.53 12.92 14.10
 - bond scheme 9.25 10.07 10.07 10.19 18.00 19.01 19.45 21.37 22.22 22.85 24.16 24.51 25.25 26.85
Rental price of arable dry land - [€/ha]
 - agenda 2000 570 618 628 641 663 690 718 740 760 771 784 804 814 828
 - actual implementation 570 618 628 641 668 695 730 758 780 808 829 852 863 878
 - bond scheme 570 618 628 641 363 369 376 381 388 398 409 415 422 426
Rental price of arable irrigable land - [€/ha]
 - agenda 2000 700 938 1,384 1,834 1,908 2,148 2,141 2,177 2,350 2,427 2,431 2,423 2,515 2,501
 - actual implementation 700 938 1,384 1,834 1,937 2,253 2,303 2,346 2,595 2,629 2,659 2,821 2,909 2,905
 - bond scheme 700 938 1,384 1,834 2,619 2,301 2,195 2,078 2,090 2,102 2,057 2,063 2,051 2,074
Rental price of generic grassland - [€/ha]
 - agenda 2000 254 691 691 691 887 887 1,109 1,342 1,343 1,394 1,457 1,457 1,502 1,563
 - actual implementation 254 691 691 691 655 655 614 703 666 619 615 617 644 668
 - bond scheme 254 691 691 691 91 91 91 72 78 76 90 103 116 114
Rental price of table wine area - [€/ha]
 - agenda 2000 1,600 1,403 1,403 1,403 1,415 1,419 1,455 1,469 1,442 1,467 1,470 1,459 1,464 1,473
 - actual implementation 1,600 1,403 1,403 1,403 1,430 1,457 1,531 1,557 1,600 1,669 1,720 1,729 1,856 1,870
 - bond scheme 1,600 1,403 1,403 1,403 1,370 1,358 1,364 1,335 1,352 1,362 1,415 1,431 1,489 1,499
Rental price of quality wine area - [€/ha]
 - agenda 2000 0 1,798 1,798 1,798 1,798 1,798 1,798 1,792 1,792 1,749 1,782 1,782 1,771 1,757
 - actual implementation 0 1,798 1,798 1,798 1,798 1,798 1,798 1,782 1,782 1,743 1,936 1,961 1,972 1,995
 - bond scheme 0 1,798 1,798 1,798 1,758 1,758 1,758 1,734 1,750 1,736 1,770 1,793 1,813 1,812
Rental price of olives for oil dry area - [€/ha]
 - agenda 2000 678 860 954 954 954 1,152 1,152 1,172 1,375 1,548 1,759 1,779 1,960 2,019
 - actual implementation 678 860 954 954 954 1,040 1,040 1,003 1,065 1,096 1,171 1,128 1,175 1,261
 - bond scheme 678 860 954 954 801 795 795 716 709 716 734 747 787 807
Rental price of olives for oil irrigable area - [€/ha]
 - agenda 2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 - actual implementation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 - bond scheme 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rental price of citrus fruit area - [€/ha]
 - agenda 2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 - actual implementation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 - bond scheme 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Share of unused occupied land - [%]
 - agenda 2000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 - actual implementation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 - bond scheme 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Idle arable dry land - [%]
 - agenda 2000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 - actual implementation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 - bond scheme 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Idle arable irrigable land - [%]
 - agenda 2000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 - actual implementation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 - bond scheme 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Idle grassland - [%]
 - agenda 2000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Colli Esini results
 - actual implementation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 - bond scheme 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Beef - [LU/ha]
 - agenda 2000 0.042 0.050 0.051 0.051 0.052 0.052 0.054 0.055 0.055 0.057 0.055 0.057 0.057 0.059
 - actual implementation 0.042 0.050 0.051 0.051 0.039 0.039 0.037 0.036 0.034 0.030 0.029 0.029 0.036 0.034
 - bond scheme 0.042 0.050 0.051 0.051 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 - agenda 2000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
 - actual implementation 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004
 - bond scheme 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012
Dairy - [LU/ha]
 - agenda 2000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 - actual implementation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 - bond scheme 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 - agenda 2000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 - actual implementation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 - bond scheme 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Total livestock - [LU/ha]
 - agenda 2000 0.044 0.050 0.051 0.051 0.052 0.052 0.054 0.055 0.055 0.057 0.055 0.057 0.058 0.060
 - actual implementation 0.044 0.050 0.051 0.051 0.042 0.042 0.040 0.039 0.038 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.040 0.039
 - bond scheme 0.044 0.050 0.051 0.051 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012
Total agricultural labour - [AWU/100ha]
 - agenda 2000 6.03 5.47 5.27 5.12 4.78 4.58 4.54 4.34 4.26 4.18 4.06 3.97 3.80 3.35
 - actual implementation 6.03 5.47 5.27 5.12 4.70 4.58 4.47 4.24 4.01 3.85 3.55 3.53 3.36 2.87
 - bond scheme 6.03 5.47 5.27 5.12 3.77 3.62 3.61 3.67 3.58 3.38 3.37 3.29 3.22 2.92
Share of family labour - [%]
 - agenda 2000 92.86 92.29 92.61 92.74 92.45 92.48 92.22 92.37 92.50 92.26 91.21 90.82 92.40 92.91
 - actual implementation 92.86 92.29 92.61 92.74 93.39 93.38 93.29 93.31 93.56 93.39 92.63 92.59 92.78 92.61
 - bond scheme 92.86 92.29 92.61 92.74 93.55 93.86 94.85 94.74 94.73 94.84 94.69 95.59 95.28 96.15
Share of family labour spent off farm - [%]
 - agenda 2000 36.04 38.02 39.81 40.33 43.89 44.56 44.94 46.48 45.97 46.15 46.01 46.92 46.70 47.59
 - actual implementation 36.04 38.02 39.81 40.33 43.95 44.64 45.47 47.35 48.40 49.49 51.73 51.80 53.95 57.15
 - bond scheme 36.04 38.02 39.81 40.33 32.29 32.73 31.39 26.53 25.88 27.72 25.25 25.32 25.43 27.13
Total incomes by farm (profit + off farm incomes) - [€]
 - agenda 2000 14,052 14,917 15,080 15,269 15,539 15,785 16,025 16,417 16,856 17,359 17,926 18,293 18,715 19,947
 - actual implementation 14,052 14,917 15,080 15,269 15,874 16,027 16,277 16,668 17,159 17,903 18,388 18,499 18,937 20,074
 - bond scheme 14,052 14,917 15,080 15,269 20,333 21,089 21,518 22,401 23,059 23,459 24,223 24,444 25,059 26,132
Share of incomes from off farm activity - [%]
 - agenda 2000 26.584 27.168 28.228 28.305 30.465 30.550 30.693 31.342 30.420 30.243 29.687 30.199 29.632 28.742
 - actual implementation 26.584 27.168 28.228 28.305 29.863 30.124 30.546 31.417 31.636 32.131 33.146 33.133 34.029 34.428
 - bond scheme 26.584 27.168 28.228 28.305 18.882 18.830 18.037 14.952 14.272 15.209 13.641 13.631 13.523 13.960
Farm incomes by farm - [€]
 - agenda 2000 10,317 10,864 10,823 10,947 10,805 10,963 11,106 11,272 11,729 12,109 12,604 12,769 13,169 14,214
 - actual implementation 10,317 10,864 10,823 10,947 11,133 11,199 11,305 11,431 11,731 12,151 12,293 12,370 12,493 13,163
 - bond scheme 10,317 10,864 10,823 10,947 16,494 17,117 17,637 19,051 19,768 19,891 20,918 21,112 21,670 22,484
Total development of total transfers - [x1,000,000 €]
 - agenda 2000 22.43 22.60 22.62 22.58 22.55 22.50 22.56 22.50 22.60 22.75 22.73 22.74 22.78 22.98
 - actual implementation 22.43 22.60 22.62 22.58 23.37 23.28 23.20 23.17 23.17 23.13 23.11 23.11 23.09 23.09
 - bond scheme 22.43 22.60 22.62 22.58 14.38 14.02 13.77 12.56 12.53 12.42 12.29 12.28 12.26 12.23
Transfers by farm - [x1,000 €]
 - agenda 2000 4.09 4.48 4.49 4.53 4.58 4.66 4.73 4.84 5.02 5.23 5.49 5.66 5.84 6.49
 - actual implementation 4.09 4.48 4.49 4.53 4.75 4.79 4.83 4.95 5.15 5.43 5.66 5.71 5.88 6.42
 - bond scheme 4.09 4.48 4.49 4.53 5.10 5.25 5.27 5.30 5.50 5.59 5.85 5.93 6.10 6.47
 - agenda 2000 441.9 445.3 445.7 444.9 444.3 443.3 444.5 443.3 445.2 448.2 447.7 448.0 448.9 452.7
 - actual implementation 441.9 445.3 445.7 444.9 460.5 458.6 457.1 456.5 456.4 455.7 455.2 455.2 454.9 455.0
 - bond scheme 441.9 445.3 445.7 444.9 283.3 276.2 271.2 248.0 247.4 244.8 242.2 242.0 241.6 240.9
Real decoupling rate - [%]
 - agenda 2000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 - actual implementation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 81.51 81.60 81.56 81.61 81.59 81.64 81.66 81.67 81.68 81.68
 - bond scheme 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 95.61 95.50 95.42 94.98 94.97 94.92 94.87 94.86 94.86 94.84
Share of irrigated land - [%]
 - agenda 2000 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1
Suckler cows - [LU/ha]
Ovins and goats - [LU/ha]
Transfers by hectar - [€]
 - actual implementation 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.8 3.0
 - bond scheme 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.7 3.1 3.4 3.8 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Durum wheat - [ha]
 - agenda 2000 24,085 24,034 24,040 24,045 24,048 24,059 24,059 24,073 24,081 24,081 24,122 24,125 24,138 24,171
 - actual implementation 24,085 24,034 24,040 24,045 23,717 23,740 23,741 23,756 23,746 23,715 23,671 23,682 23,492 23,527
 - bond scheme 24,085 24,034 24,040 24,045 23,247 23,191 22,972 23,050 23,032 23,209 23,143 23,166 22,992 23,040
Sugar beet - [ha]
 - agenda 2000 7,899 8,147 8,156 8,249 8,342 8,448 8,420 8,623 8,426 8,184 8,163 8,237 8,185 7,887
 - actual implementation 7,899 8,147 8,156 8,249 11,216 11,216 11,216 11,216 11,216 11,216 11,216 11,216 11,216 11,216
 - bond scheme 7,899 8,147 8,156 8,249 11,216 11,205 11,186 11,149 11,141 11,134 11,119 11,115 11,111 11,111
Maize - [ha]
 - agenda 2000 5,092 5,018 4,966 4,908 4,864 4,791 4,753 4,687 4,740 4,921 4,896 4,725 4,772 4,823
 - actual implementation 5,092 5,018 4,966 4,908 2,466 2,587 2,611 2,702 2,723 2,829 2,861 2,885 2,986 2,955
 - bond scheme 5,092 5,018 4,966 4,908 4,216 4,246 4,355 4,336 4,365 4,168 4,234 4,214 4,412 4,414
Vegetables - [ha]
 - agenda 2000 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,132
 - actual implementation 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145
 - bond scheme 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,294 1,473 1,623 1,787 1,787 1,816 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846
Set-aside - [ha]
 - agenda 2000 4,372 4,372 4,372 4,372 4,372 4,372 4,372 4,372 4,372 4,372 4,372 4,372 4,372 4,373
 - actual implementation 4,372 4,372 4,372 4,372 5,456 5,262 5,261 5,188 5,247 5,210 5,214 5,167 5,196 5,232
 - bond scheme 4,372 4,372 4,372 4,372 4,357 4,339 4,324 4,308 4,308 4,305 4,302 4,302 4,302 4,302
Total permanent crops - [ha]
 - agenda 2000 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905
 - actual implementation 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905
 - bond scheme 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905 4,905
Vineyards - [ha]
 - agenda 2000 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855
 - actual implementation 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855
 - bond scheme 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855 3,855
Olives (for oil) - [ha]
 - agenda 2000 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050
 - actual implementation 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050
 - bond scheme 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050
Citrus fruits - [ha]
 - agenda 2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 - actual implementation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 - bond scheme 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Total number of farms - [farms]
 - agenda 2000 4,620 3,900 3,900 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,870 3,840 3,840 3,810 3,750 3,690 3,690 3,660
 - actual implementation 4,620 3,900 3,900 3,870 3,840 3,810 3,780 3,750 3,750 3,720 3,690 3,660 3,600 3,570
 - bond scheme 4,620 3,900 3,900 3,870 3,150 3,120 3,060 3,000 2,970 2,850 2,760 2,730 2,670 2,640
Profit - [€/ha]
 - agenda 2000 2,166 2,128 2,147 2,166 2,190 2,223 2,227 2,225 2,232 2,244 2,216 2,218 2,233 2,222
 - actual implementation 2,166 2,128 2,147 2,166 2,058 2,077 2,059 2,065 2,067 2,051 2,041 2,047 2,039 2,034
 - bond scheme 2,166 2,128 2,147 2,166 1,736 1,783 1,798 1,824 1,817 1,804 1,783 1,798 1,810 1,831
Average farm size - [ha]
 - agenda 2000 4.25 5.04 5.04 5.08 5.08 5.08 5.08 5.12 5.12 5.16 5.24 5.33 5.33 5.37
 - actual implementation 4.25 5.04 5.04 5.08 5.12 5.16 5.20 5.24 5.24 5.28 5.33 5.37 5.46 5.50
 - bond scheme 4.25 5.04 5.04 5.08 5.90 5.93 6.05 6.13 6.20 6.39 6.57 6.60 6.68 6.70
Rental price of arable dry land - [€/ha]
 - agenda 2000 180 180 364 526 692 774 774 774 774 849 933 1,133 1,218 1,296
 - actual implementation 180 180 364 526 699 781 781 781 781 857 938 1,090 1,206 1,315
 - bond scheme 180 180 364 526 631 656 656 676 690 698 722 750 781 815
Rental price of arable irrigable land - [€/ha]
 - agenda 2000 780 1,235 1,371 1,473 1,545 1,580 1,672 1,812 1,858 1,934 1,977 2,025 2,086 2,116
 - actual implementation 780 1,235 1,371 1,473 1,625 1,732 1,851 2,000 2,036 2,153 2,249 2,278 2,340 2,377
 - bond scheme 780 1,235 1,371 1,473 1,543 1,552 1,542 1,538 1,538 1,511 1,511 1,510 1,498 1,491
Rental price of generic grassland - [€/ha]
 - agenda 2000 104 753 835 861 891 950 1,048 1,140 1,142 1,207 1,279 1,369 1,411 1,499
 - actual implementation 104 753 835 861 899 965 1,049 1,134 1,132 1,152 1,232 1,355 1,388 1,453
 - bond scheme 104 753 835 861 871 853 884 888 870 827 805 838 830 832
Rental price of table wine area - [€/ha]
 - agenda 2000 0 594 594 594 641 770 770 806 851 881 908 906 956 977
 - actual implementation 0 594 594 594 641 801 801 834 864 897 923 1,020 1,035 1,132
 - bond scheme 0 594 594 594 641 770 770 806 838 869 906 938 968 946
Rental price of quality wine area - [€/ha]
 - agenda 2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 - actual implementation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 - bond scheme 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rental price of olives for oil dry area - [€/ha]
 - agenda 2000 1,380 927 922 922 921 933 943 959 977 995 1,020 1,028 1,042 1,054
 - actual implementation 1,380 927 922 922 927 945 955 959 962 961 971 982 980 989
 - bond scheme 1,380 927 922 922 906 796 750 750 712 655 644 620 557 410
Rental price of olives for oil irrigable area - [€/ha]
 - agenda 2000 1,720 1,779 1,795 1,807 1,886 1,896 1,962 2,006 2,036 2,079 2,134 2,149 2,168 2,175
 - actual implementation 1,720 1,779 1,795 1,807 1,701 1,661 1,635 1,584 1,570 1,537 1,511 1,502 1,499 1,517
 - bond scheme 1,720 1,779 1,795 1,807 500 458 329 298 239 219 175 162 153 156
Rental price of citrus fruit area - [€/ha]
 - agenda 2000 2,070 1,566 1,541 1,516 1,536 1,524 1,543 1,557 1,547 1,575 1,529 1,522 1,551 1,548
 - actual implementation 2,070 1,566 1,541 1,516 1,582 1,739 1,802 1,847 1,956 2,119 2,209 2,209 2,270 2,270
 - bond scheme 2,070 1,566 1,541 1,516 1,557 1,552 1,570 1,576 1,553 1,542 1,482 1,467 1,502 1,505
Share of unused occupied land - [%]
 - agenda 2000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 - actual implementation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 - bond scheme 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.055 0.058 0.058 0.065 0.063 0.073 0.077 0.083 0.092 0.100
Idle arable dry land - [%]
 - agenda 2000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 - actual implementation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 - bond scheme 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Idle arable irrigable land - [%]
 - agenda 2000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 - actual implementation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 - bond scheme 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Idle grassland - [%]
 - agenda 2000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 - actual implementation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.549 0.783 0.783 0.783 0.779 0.779 0.779 0.231 0.231 0.231
Piana di Sibari results
 - bond scheme 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Beef - [LU/ha]
 - agenda 2000 0.118 0.120 0.122 0.122 0.121 0.121 0.121 0.122 0.123 0.122 0.121 0.121 0.121 0.122
 - actual implementation 0.118 0.120 0.122 0.122 0.121 0.121 0.121 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.119 0.120 0.120
 - bond scheme 0.118 0.120 0.122 0.122 0.128 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.128 0.127 0.124 0.120 0.122
 - agenda 2000 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
 - actual implementation 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008
 - bond scheme 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010
Dairy - [LU/ha]
 - agenda 2000 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
 - actual implementation 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
 - bond scheme 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.024 0.028 0.028
 - agenda 2000 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 - actual implementation 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
 - bond scheme 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Total livestock - [LU/ha]
 - agenda 2000 0.133 0.129 0.131 0.131 0.133 0.133 0.133 0.133 0.134 0.136 0.136 0.137 0.137 0.137
 - actual implementation 0.133 0.129 0.131 0.131 0.133 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.136 0.136
 - bond scheme 0.133 0.129 0.131 0.131 0.141 0.146 0.146 0.147 0.147 0.148 0.148 0.157 0.159 0.161
Total agricultural labour - [AWU/100ha]
 - agenda 2000 17.89 17.42 17.20 17.01 16.93 16.81 16.42 16.16 15.64 15.56 15.00 14.74 14.67 14.45
 - actual implementation 17.89 17.42 17.20 17.01 16.03 15.90 15.49 15.38 14.90 14.86 14.45 14.20 14.00 13.64
 - bond scheme 17.89 17.42 17.20 17.01 14.54 14.49 14.34 14.29 13.71 13.45 12.99 12.80 12.72 12.45
Share of family labour - [%]
 - agenda 2000 92.40 67.68 67.90 68.29 68.32 68.66 69.49 69.52 71.37 71.38 72.13 72.32 72.74 72.45
 - actual implementation 92.40 67.68 67.90 68.29 68.80 68.65 68.76 68.35 70.19 69.73 70.91 71.27 71.22 72.15
 - bond scheme 92.40 67.68 67.90 68.29 63.47 63.36 63.12 62.60 64.02 63.41 63.73 64.08 63.36 63.91
Share of family labour spent off farm - [%]
 - agenda 2000 13.11 3.55 3.54 3.59 3.86 3.89 3.89 4.05 4.12 4.06 4.22 3.96 3.82 3.57
 - actual implementation 13.11 3.55 3.54 3.59 6.20 6.67 7.34 7.78 7.70 7.31 7.14 7.28 6.98 6.98
 - bond scheme 13.11 3.55 3.54 3.59 7.41 7.60 6.53 6.53 6.43 4.71 3.71 3.55 3.50 3.66
Total incomes by farm (profit + off farm incomes) - [€]
 - agenda 2000 10,085 10,951 11,118 11,268 11,408 11,575 11,666 11,792 11,836 11,983 12,037 12,223 12,296 12,436
 - actual implementation 10,085 10,951 11,118 11,268 11,038 11,215 11,327 11,474 11,514 11,608 11,634 11,768 11,895 12,009
 - bond scheme 10,085 10,951 11,118 11,268 10,831 11,143 11,373 11,621 11,704 12,008 12,145 12,287 12,510 12,700
Share of incomes from off farm activity - [%]
 - agenda 2000 8.667 2.100 2.691 2.378 2.506 2.484 3.083 3.455 3.491 3.429 3.523 3.354 3.269 4.066
 - actual implementation 8.667 2.100 2.691 2.378 4.608 4.492 5.487 5.674 5.945 6.676 6.597 6.631 6.450 6.752
 - bond scheme 8.667 2.100 2.691 2.378 5.491 5.060 4.359 3.864 3.774 4.026 3.521 3.418 3.366 3.407
Farm incomes by farm - [€]
 - agenda 2000 9,211 10,721 10,818 11,000 11,122 11,287 11,306 11,384 11,423 11,572 11,613 11,813 11,894 11,930
 - actual implementation 9,211 10,721 10,818 11,000 10,530 10,712 10,705 10,823 10,829 10,833 10,867 10,988 11,127 11,198
 - bond scheme 9,211 10,721 10,818 11,000 10,236 10,579 10,877 11,172 11,262 11,524 11,718 11,867 12,089 12,267
Total development of total transfers - [x1,000,000 €]
 - agenda 2000 12.30 14.06 14.07 14.06 14.06 14.06 14.05 14.04 14.05 14.04 14.04 14.06 14.04 14.02
 - actual implementation 12.30 14.06 14.07 14.06 12.17 12.18 12.19 12.20 12.19 12.17 12.17 12.17 12.15 12.14
 - bond scheme 12.30 14.06 14.07 14.06 8.98 8.98 8.83 8.68 8.62 8.36 8.15 8.06 7.94 7.84
Transfers by farm - [x1,000 €]
 - agenda 2000 2.66 3.60 3.61 3.63 3.63 3.63 3.63 3.66 3.66 3.69 3.74 3.81 3.81 3.83
 - actual implementation 2.66 3.60 3.61 3.63 3.17 3.20 3.22 3.25 3.25 3.27 3.30 3.33 3.38 3.40
 - bond scheme 2.66 3.60 3.61 3.63 2.85 2.88 2.88 2.89 2.90 2.94 2.95 2.95 2.97 2.97
 - agenda 2000 625.8 715.5 715.8 715.3 715.6 715.6 714.9 714.8 715.0 714.6 714.4 715.5 714.6 713.7
 - actual implementation 625.8 715.5 715.8 715.3 619.1 620.1 620.4 621.1 620.5 619.4 619.4 619.5 618.4 618.1
 - bond scheme 625.8 715.5 715.8 715.3 483.8 485.0 476.8 472.5 468.2 459.4 449.6 447.5 444.9 443.3
Real decoupling rate - [%]
 - agenda 2000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 - actual implementation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 92.85 92.97 93.17 93.04 93.07 93.20 93.16 93.16 93.33 93.31
 - bond scheme 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.52 99.53 99.53 99.53 99.52 99.52 99.49 99.50 99.47 99.46
Share of irrigated land - [%]
 - agenda 2000 55.5 56.7 56.9 57.0 57.1 57.2 57.3 57.4 57.4 57.5 57.7 57.7 57.8 57.9
 - actual implementation 55.5 56.7 56.9 57.0 57.2 57.1 57.2 57.3 57.3 57.1 57.1 57.3 57.0 57.0
Suckler cows - [LU/ha]
Ovins and goats - [LU/ha]
Transfers by hectar - [€]
 - bond scheme 55.5 56.7 56.9 57.0 56.7 56.9 57.2 57.3 57.8 57.6 57.7 58.3 58.5 58.5
Durum wheat - [ha]
 - agenda 2000 2,613 2,740 2,711 2,682 2,681 2,681 2,667 2,621 2,613 2,603 2,575 2,587 2,565 2,528
 - actual implementation 2,613 2,740 2,711 2,682 1,358 1,351 1,386 1,610 1,587 1,664 1,795 1,808 1,802 1,947
 - bond scheme 2,613 2,740 2,711 2,682 78 78 75 72 67 75 67 67 75 70
Sugar beet - [ha]
 - agenda 2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 - actual implementation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 - bond scheme 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maize - [ha]
 - agenda 2000 1,501 1,485 1,502 1,521 1,544 1,551 1,542 1,570 1,570 1,590 1,619 1,654 1,639 1,625
 - actual implementation 1,501 1,485 1,502 1,521 1,540 1,564 1,625 1,651 1,656 1,684 1,733 1,712 1,774 1,816
 - bond scheme 1,501 1,485 1,502 1,521 1,950 1,948 1,983 1,958 2,012 1,986 1,969 1,992 2,077 2,061
Vegetables - [ha]
 - agenda 2000 1,529 1,418 1,442 1,454 1,449 1,439 1,463 1,445 1,449 1,448 1,448 1,429 1,456 1,488
 - actual implementation 1,529 1,418 1,442 1,454 1,547 1,593 1,645 1,715 1,715 1,767 1,843 1,845 1,907 1,966
 - bond scheme 1,529 1,418 1,442 1,454 1,916 1,914 1,965 1,939 2,025 1,979 1,956 1,998 2,134 2,107
Set-aside - [ha]
 - agenda 2000 340 358 385 412 429 432 432 436 435 436 442 446 443 443
 - actual implementation 340 358 385 412 484 504 514 526 528 521 533 535 539 543
 - bond scheme 340 358 385 412 533 537 547 543 553 551 542 550 565 559
Total permanent crops - [ha]
 - agenda 2000 10,895 11,070 11,070 11,070 11,070 11,085 11,085 11,100 11,100 11,100 11,100 11,100 11,100 11,100
 - actual implementation 10,895 11,070 11,070 11,070 9,492 9,353 8,957 8,957 8,930 8,603 8,551 8,519 8,221 8,089
 - bond scheme 10,895 11,070 11,070 11,070 7,543 7,538 7,355 7,365 7,324 6,874 6,778 6,755 6,456 6,411
Vineyards - [ha]
 - agenda 2000 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225
 - actual implementation 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225
 - bond scheme 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225
Olives (for oil) - [ha]
 - agenda 2000 5,750 5,835 5,835 5,835 5,835 5,835 5,835 5,835 5,835 5,835 5,835 5,835 5,835 5,835
 - actual implementation 5,750 5,835 5,835 5,835 4,227 4,088 3,692 3,692 3,665 3,338 3,286 3,254 2,956 2,824
 - bond scheme 5,750 5,835 5,835 5,835 2,278 2,273 2,090 2,100 2,059 1,609 1,513 1,490 1,191 1,146
Citrus fruits - [ha]
 - agenda 2000 4,920 5,010 5,010 5,010 5,010 5,025 5,025 5,040 5,040 5,040 5,040 5,040 5,040 5,040
 - actual implementation 4,920 5,010 5,010 5,010 5,040 5,040 5,040 5,040 5,040 5,040 5,040 5,040 5,040 5,040
 - bond scheme 4,920 5,010 5,010 5,010 5,040 5,040 5,040 5,040 5,040 5,040 5,040 5,040 5,040 5,040
